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ABSTRACT
Our study presents a new tool, Reputation Agent, to promote fairer
reviews from requesters (employers or customers) on gig markets.
Unfair reviews, created when requesters consider factors outside of
a worker’s control, are known to plague gig workers and can result
in lost job opportunities and even termination from themarketplace.
Our tool leverages machine learning to implement an intelligent
interface that: (1) uses deep learning to automatically detect when
an individual has included unfair factors into her review (factors
outside the worker’s control per the policies of the market); and (2)
prompts the individual to reconsider her review if she has incorpo-
rated unfair factors. To study the effectiveness of Reputation Agent,
we conducted a controlled experiment over different gig markets.
Our experiment illustrates that across markets, Reputation Agent,
in contrast with traditional approaches, motivates requesters to
review gig workers’ performance more fairly. We discuss how tools
that bring more transparency to employers about the policies of
a gig market can help build empathy thus resulting in reasoned
discussions around potential injustices towards workers generated
by these interfaces. Our vision is that with tools that promote truth
and transparency we can bring fairer treatment to gig workers.
1 INTRODUCTION
Gig marketplaces are online spaces where almost anyone can con-
tract independent workers (e.g., freelancers) to conduct labor or
deliver services in the form of short-term engagements [24]. Gig
markets facilitate transactions between strangers, as people typi-
cally have to hire and manage a crowd of workers they have never
met [10, 98]. Similarly, workers on these platforms often coordi-
nate with other workers[54] and offer services to requesters (cus-
tomers or employers) who are all unfamiliar to them [83]. These
direct interactions between strangers mean that gig markets must
have mechanisms through which people can truthfully assess each
other, i.e., earning money by entrust their hard labor to strangers
[35, 78, 84, 95, 100]. One of the most popular instruments for help-
ing people to assess strangers and to choose who to hire are rep-
utation systems which function by asking individuals to provide
feedback on others’ work. These systems are generally based on
the platform’s review metrics. For gig workerâĂŹs, reputation has
become especially important because it is critical for accessing
higher-paying jobs [74, 77] or even staying employed [44].
In this context, it is important to understand that in the power dy-
namics of most gigmarkets, the platform takes the side of requesters
[98] or the platforms manipulate the market to the detriment of
the worker [17, 98]. Therefore, if a requester invests time to write
a lengthy complaint about a worker (even if the requester is incor-
rect), the market will side with the requester, potentially leading to
unfair termination. For instance, the following advise is from an
Uber driver for other gig drivers [27]: “...[one of the main reasons
for Uber to terminate a driver is that the] passenger makes a serious
Figure 1: Overview of how Reputation Agent functions.
complaint about you [the driver]. If a passenger goes out of their way
to tell Uber that you were rude, or that you’re a bad driver, or that
you made them uncomfortable in any way, you can be immediately
deactivated without prior notice. You aren’t likely to be reactivated
after a major passenger complaintâĂę”
This environment where workers have limited mechanisms to
negotiate or even discuss reviews has led workers to distrust gig
markets altogether [44, 52]. Thus, it is crucial to ensure that the
reviews about workers are fair in order to improve trust and the
general operation of gig markets [9]. Fairness within gig markets
typically involves ensuring that the policies on the market are
transparent, concise, and accessible to workers [42, 96]. However,
we argue that fairness is not just about empowering workers to
understand the policies of the markets in which they participate;
it is also about guiding the requester in the market to evaluate
workers based on the market’s established policies [33].
Requesters should have a clear understanding of what metrics
they should consider and which are inappropriate. Thus, it be-
comes critical to have mechanisms through which requesters can
discriminate between the interactions and labor that workers are
expected to control (according to the policies of the market) and
those that were outside workers’ control [25]. This first type of
interaction is known as âĂĲmission-criticalâĂİ and the latter as
âĂĲnon-criticalâĂİ [103]. Gig marketplaces have historically had
difficulties in ensuring that requesters focus on evaluating mission-
critical factors [39, 90]. To help, practitioners and researchers have
started to investigate different interfaces for facilitating the gener-
ation of more mission-critical reviews [37] which use drop-down
lists to guide people on what metrics to focus on [54]. However,
these interfaces rarely focus on guiding people on the written re-
views. As a consequence, unjust written reviews continue to plague
gig markets [13, 72] and have resulted in problematic outcomes,
such as termination of workers’ accounts. This can eliminate an
important source of income [88].
Seeing the need to motivate requesters to write fairer written
reviews on gig markets, we present a new novel tool, Reputation
Agent, which is an intelligent web plugin that detects when re-
questers have written reviews that consider factors outside a work-
erâĂŹs control. In such cases, Reputation Agent prompts people
to reflect and focus on the performance metrics that are actually
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within the workers’ control sphere. We designed Reputation Agent
as a web plugin to empower platformmaintainers to easily integrate
the tool into their existing gig markets without having to change
any of their front-end interfaces. Fig 1. presents an overview of how
Reputation Agent functions. We conducted a study to evaluate how
effective Reputation Agent was in prompting people to generate
reviews that focus on metrics within workers’ control. In order to
investigate our tool in depth, we chose various gig markets (Uber,
Upwork, and Grubhub) and recruited 480 reviewers to evaluate gig
workers across several scenarios. Across these different gig markets,
reviewers working with Reputation Agent were motivated to focus
significantly more on metrics that the worker could control instead
of metrics outside of the workerâĂŹs scope.
Our paper contributes a new tool which leverages machine learn-
ing for fostering fairer written reviews about gig workers. Our de-
sign also provides a novel understanding of requesters who didn’t
change their reviews for the following reasons: truthfulness, empa-
thy, warning, and agency. Through the ease of implementing our
plug-in tool and the understanding gained about why requesters
don’t change their reviews, we hope that further studies can elabo-
rate on the importance of integrating requesters’ decision-making
process into their studies to order to achieve fairer reviews for work-
ers. Our discussion: (i) focuses on how tools such as Reputation
Agent can motivate requesters to write more accurate performance
reviews in a manner that provides productive feedback for the
crowd market community; and (ii) explores how tools, like Reputa-
tion Agent, could help to develop empathy and motivate reflections
on the type of policies and agencies that people desire within a
gig market. Our hope is that systems, like Reputation Agent, can
initiate a future environment where workers operate in a fairer,
more truthful space; an atmosphere in which all participants have
a clearer understanding of the policies and labor conditions of the
crowd market. This along with the hope that it will guide a future
where gig workers no longer fear unjust termination.
2 RELATEDWORK
The design of Reputation Agent is based on two main areas: (1)
tools for written reviews; and (2) reputation systems.
2.1 Gig Marketplaces
Gig markets bring new jobs to the marketplace [16]. However, due
to the nontraditional nature of the gig economy, criteria and tools
to improve the labor conditions for workers are still necessary
for researchers to investigate to ensure a safe and fair working
environment for gig workers. [13, 14, 47–49, 53–55, 59, 95, 96]. Gig
markets rely heavily on reviews to help requesters identify which
workers to hire and help workers ensure fair compensation [61, 92].
It is this reliance on reviews that our study focuses on as bad reviews
can pose an obstacle to workers. This is due to the fact that gig
markets have been plagued with unfair reviews which contain
inaccurate reputation signals about workers. These unfair reviews
can ultimately limit workersâĂŹ future job opportunities and can
also result in workers not getting paid or even being terminated
from the marketplace. Unfair reviews are generally created because
employers have a hard time differentiating the factors within the
workers’ control and the ones that have little to do with their
performance (e.g., when they complain about an Uber driver getting
stuck in traffic). However, because market power is typically placed
in the hands of employers, a bad worker review can result in the
worker losing her entire livelihood. It is important to research how
tools can be implemented to protect gig workers [102].
2.2 Tools for Written Reviews
Platforms for improving people’s written reviews can be divided
into two main types: Interface or Artificial Intelligence based.
2.2.1 Interface Based. Several interfaces have emerged that focus
on driving people to provide better-written reviews about others.
One set of these systems has focused on guiding better reviews
within educational systems[18, 66]. Cook et al. [22] explored how
the use of interfaces that have guiding questions can facilitate the
generation of better reviews within project-based learning. In our
research, we build on the ideas behind these systems to now imagine
interfaces that guide requesters to write fairer reviews about their
fellow workers.
2.2.2 Artificial Intelligence Based. Another subset of related tools
have focused on using artificial intelligence to help reviewers. The
work of Krause et al. [64] explored how natural language models
could be used to guide designers to provide higher quality reviews
about the work of their peers (which was not necessarily fair).
Inspired by these ideas, we explored with Reputation Agent how
different language models could be used to now guide requesters to
write fairer reviews. For Reputation Agent we also used language
models to identify when a requester is writing a review that is unfair
and guide requesters to write reviews more focused on factors that
workers controlled.
Some of the first intelligent tools around reviews were auto-
mated methods that inferred the expected reputation scores that
people would input based on their written reviews [2, 85]. Others
developed sentiment analysis methods to detect the polarity (pos-
itive, negative or neutral) of reviews [21, 29]. Sentiment analysis
has played an important role in improving the automated analysis
and understanding of text reviews [8, 31, 46, 73]. Similarly, devel-
opments in deep learning algorithms have further facilitated the
automated understanding and even categorization of marketplace
reviews [63, 67]. Deep learning algorithms and other related meth-
ods have facilitated automatically detecting more complex metrics
aside from sentiment, such as the expected level of helpfulness of
a review [97], who was to blame for a car accident based on a car
insurgence report [32], health risks in restaurants based on people’s
reviews on Twitter [89] or detecting biased Amazon reviews [30].
We use inspiration from these intelligent systems to envision how
deep learning could be used to automatically flag unfair reviews.
2.2.3 Fairness In Crowd-Powered Text Reviews. Within the context
of Gig markets, fairness usually relates to the conditions of the
workers laboring on these platforms [36]. Graham et al. [43] re-
cently created a framework to score gig markets based on how fair
they are to workers. Some of the variables considered were whether
the platform paid gig workers the minimumwage and ensured their
health and safety at work. Other measures revolved around whether
the contracts and policies were transparent, concise, and accessible
to workers. Our goal with Reputation Agent, inspired by the latter
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point, was to facilitate mechanisms through which the policies of
a gig market could be presented in a clearer, more conscientious
manner. However, our focus was not just on presenting the policies
to workers. But rather, facilitating an understanding of policies by
requesters, who must judge workers and can, ultimately, have a
lasting effect on their future job opportunities. Additionally, we
focused on designing a tool that could be easily adapted to any
gig market. We believe fairer marketplaces can be constructed by
presenting more clearly to employers the roles of workers.
Ensuring fairness in performance evaluations is a common chal-
lenge across gig markets [15, 79]. Unfair evaluations can come from
individuals or groups [4]. Several systems have implemented differ-
ent mechanisms to ensure that the evaluations that people generate
about others are fair. However, most of these systems operate only
at the score or metrics level [91]. These systems, generally, do not
take any action to correct “nasty”reviews. But, leaving unfair tex-
tual reviews intact can mean that the review can continue to affect
the person long after the interaction took place. With Reputation
Agent we focus on addressing this problem by detecting unfair
reviews, and guiding employers to take action to correct them.
2.3 Reputation Systems
A reputation system is any platform that evaluates businesses or
peers based on an algorithm or customer rankings, ratings, or writ-
ten comments [104]. The premise is to have parties rate each other
which results in a score. This score should assist other parties in
deciding whether or not to continue interacting with that party in
the future [58]. To operate effectively, reputation systems require at
least three properties: long-lived entities that inspire an expectation
of future interactions; capture and distribution of feedback about
current interactions (information must be visible in the future); and
use of feedback to guide trust decisions [86].
The end goal of reputation systems is to strengthen the quality
of markets and communities by providing an incentive for good
behavior and quality services, and by sanctioning bad behavior
and low-quality services [57]. In order to achieve that goal, some
reputation systems have implemented diverse workflows and vali-
dations. PowerTrust [105] takes the power-law distribution in user
feedback to get a more accurate global reputation. Whitby et al.
[101] describe a statistical filtering technique for excluding unfair
ratings via a Bayesian reputation system. Notice that prior work
focused on improving score based reputations, while our work is
based on the foundations of these systems to now assist gig markets
in reducing the number of unfair written reputation signals.
2.3.1 Reputation Systems For Gig Markets. Within gig markets,
reputation systems typically focus on evaluating the different ac-
tors involved in the market (workers, requesters and the platform
itself)[3]. Reputation systems within the context of gig markets
have become a key component for selecting the workers and clients
with whom one will collaborate. A workerâĂŹs income positively
correlates with higher reputation scores [40, 52]. Therefore, “bad
reviews” can affect worker’s access to employment and can overall
affect workersâĂŹ livelihood. Thus, designing accessible tools can
promote fairness and enables a shift in the power dynamics [102].
Different interfaces have been introduced to prompt and guide
people to write reviews that better match the labor of workers and
are potentially more fair and maintain more accurate reputations
on the marketplace. For instance, Gaikwad et al. [39] developed
Boomerang in Daemo Crowd Market, and explored interfaces that
benefited requesters by sharing more accurate information about
workers and penalizing requesters who shared inaccuracies. Such
mechanisms might not only help workers to obtain better assess-
ments of their work, but it can also help to address the ballot stuffing
problem (where people get too many positive reviews, and it thus
becomes difficult to assess who is “good”). Our research is inspired
by these prior mechanisms to drive fairer reviews and prevent as-
sessments that may unfairly affect the reputation and even the
income of gig workers.
3 REPUTATION AGENT
We argue that a way to enable fairer reviews in gig markets is
via systems that can present requesters with transparent policies
that pertain to workers without interrupting their review writing
process. This information should only be highlighted in cases when
the system identifies that the reviewer has included unfair factors
(i.e., factors, per the market’s policies, outside a workerâĂŹs con-
trol). For this purpose, our research explores: (1) machine learning
techniques that detect when an individual is focusing her review
on factors outside the workersâĂŹ sphere of control; and (2) in-
terfaces that use that information to then prompt the person to
reconsider her review in order to refocus on factors within the
worker’s control. Reputation Agent has two main components: a
âĂŸSmart ValidatorâĂŹ, to detect elements of a review that in-
cludes factors outside a workerâĂŹs control; and a âĂŸFairness
PromoterâĂŹ, to guide people to focus their review on the factors
that were within the workerâĂŹs control. Figure 1 shows how Rep-
utation Agent enhances existing review forms with these two main
parts.
Smart Validator. This component learns to detect when a re-
view has factors outside the workerâĂŹs scope according to the
policies of the market. The Smart Validator has an end-to-end work-
flow for training a machine learning model. The steps are:
A. PREPARE TRAINING DATA. This piece focuses on collecting
real reviews about gig workers. It functions as a web crawler that
collects data fromwebsites, such as SiteJabber and ConsumerAffairs,
that share real-world reviews about gig workers. Once the data
is collected, the module focuses on labeling each review based on
whether it focuses on mission-critical metrics or not (i.e., factors
that the worker controlled or not) The labeling is done by analyzing
the policies of each gig market.
B. TRAIN AND TEST INTELLIGENT MODEL. Given a set of
labeled reviews (i.e., reviews that are labeled as to whether they are
fair or unfair), Reputation Agent uses stratified sampling to split the
labeled data into training, test, and validation sets under proportions
of 80%, 10%, and 10% (the validation set helps to avoid overfitting).
Using Python 3 and the Keras framework with Tensorflow, we
trained eight models to learn to recognize reviews that evaluate
workers based onmission-critical metrics and non-critical ones. Our
goal was to identify the machine learning models which worked the
best for different gig markets. For this purpose, we trained different
machine learning models which used as feature vectors either word
vectors or embeddings:
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Figure 2: Text classifier benchmark. Recurrent Neural Net-
works (RNN) + Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) ap-
proach performed better across conditions.
Word ngram + LR: Logistic regression with word ngrams.
Char ngram + LR: Logistic regression with character ngrams.
(Word + Char ngram) + LR: Logistic regression with word and
character ngrams.
RNN no embedding: Recurrent neural network (bidirectional
GRU) without pre-trained embeddings.
RNN + GloVe embedding: Recurrent neural network (bidirec-
tional GRU) with GloVe pre-trained embeddings.
CNN (multi-channel): Multi-channel Convolutional Neural
Network.
RNN + CNN: Recurrent neural network (Bidirectional GRU) +
Convolutional Neural Network.
Google BERT [26]: Bidirectional Encoder Representations from
Transformers, is a new method of pre-training language represen-
tations which obtains state-of-the-art results on a wide range of
Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks.
We implemented early stopping as amethod to stop training once
the model performance stops improving on a hold out validation
dataset. For the deep learning models, we used a binary cross-
entropy loss function, ADAM as an optimizer, and a learning rate of
0.001. Fig. 2 presents an overview of the benchmark of the training
models (i.e., the figure shows the performance metrics of each
model). We note that different machine learning models performed
better on different gig markets. However, RNN (Recursive Neural
Network, a Deep Learning Algorithm) performed in general the best
across all gig markets. This was the reason we eventually choose to
utilize this model. After themodel has been trained, it is exposed as a
REST web service via JSON requests to our front-end interface. The
service is consumed directly by Reputation AgentâĂŹs Accuracy
Promoter and it displays the messages accordingly.
Fairness Promoter. This component displays messages to the
reviewer to prompt them to avoid considering factors outside the
workerâĂŹs control based on the policies of the market. It dis-
plays the prompt messages that the platform maintainer defines
and the messages are triggered based on the predictions from the
Smart Validator. The Fairness Promoter is a web plugin for JQuery,
a javascript framework, and works as a form validation plugin
(commonly used to prevent forms from submitting data that do not
fulfill a websiteâĂŹs validation or formatting criteria). Reputation
AgentâĂŹs Fairness Promoter is linked to a text control that trig-
gers a request to the Smart Validator every time the text control
stops being used by the reviewer. The Fairness Promoter sends the
reviewerâĂŹs current text to the Smart Validator in a JSON format.
The Smart Validator analyzes the text and returns the likelihood of
whether or not the review is focusing on factors that were within
the control of the gig worker. If it is not, the Fairness Promoter then
displays its configured messages to prompt reviewers to reconsider
their review and focus instead on variables that the worker was
able to control.
In our design of the Fairness Promoter we chose for in-form
prompting instead of popups. The logic behind this decision is that
this design can lead to faster completion times [50]. This is an im-
portant decision due to the limited time that customers usually
spend evaluating services. Additionally, we considered that some
users might have popup blockers in their browsers that could pre-
vent them from seeing the prompt. Therefore, we opted to explore
other approaches. Additionally, we chose the prompted message to
be shown after the end-user finished writing her review, instead
of while she was completing it. We made this decision because
prior research has shown that people tend to be in either a form-
completion-mode or a problem resolution mode [7]. If people are
in a form-completion-mode, they tend to ignore alert messages
(and hence Reputation Agent would be less effective). Furthermore,
we decided to place Reputation AgentâĂŹs prompting messages
close to the review text box since previous work [93] has shown
that such placement is more effective than when it is placed on
top or at the bottom of the review form. On the other hand, while
our prompting messages can be edited by platform maintainers
to publish whatever message they desire; we aimed for the initial
boxed messages to follow guidelines that prior work has deemed
are the most effective. In particular, we follow the design guidelines
from Bargas-Avila et al. [6] that stated that promoting messages
should be polite, explain the problem, and outline a solution. Our
explanation aimed to convey to requesters how their review might
be considered unfair based on the policies of the market. We also
aimed to briefly explain what type of factors are considered to be
outside the control of a worker; and offered people the solution to
re-write the parts of their review with those unfair factors.
4 EVALUATION
Reputation Agent instantiates our design hypothesis that by flag-
ging reviews with factors outside a workerâĂŹs control and then
presenting to employers what the policies of the gig market high-
light as workersâĂŹ responsibilities, we can prompt fairer assess-
ments of gig workers. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a
between-subjects study comparing Reputation Agent with control
interfaces. We had participants evaluate a gig worker, given a sce-
nario where the customer had experienced a âĂĲbad outcomeâĂİ
on the gig market. However, it was not the fault of the worker
being evaluated (i.e., factors outside the workerâĂŹs control were
to blame). We study whether people using Reputation Agent gener-
ated fairer reviews than people using control interfaces to review
gig workers under the same circumstances. Given that it was also
important for us to evaluate our tool within different gig markets
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(considering that it could be used in diverse niches), we evaluated
our tool on marketplaces similar to: Uber, GrubHub and Upwork.
4.1 Method
Our study focused on three popular gig markets (Grubhub, Uber,
and Upwork). We randomized participants into one of our experi-
mental conditions which represented a particular gig market and in-
terface for reviewing workers (Reputation agent or control). Partici-
pants had to imagine they were a gig market customer or employer
who had to write a review about a gig worker after experiencing
a “bad” outcome on the marketplace (which was not the worker’s
fault). The scenarios that participants had to consider were:
1) Uber Scenario. Participants are passengers in a ride-sharing
platform (e.g., Uber) where the driver had followed the recom-
mended GPS route, had a clean car, had picked them up and dropped
them off in the correct locations, and was polite. However, due to
the heavy traffic, they experienced a delayed trip and had to pay an
overpriced fee. The tardiness of their ride resulted in them missing
an important meeting with a client and losing a contract.
2) GrubHub Scenario. Participants have an important lunch
with a client and ordered the meal through an on-demand food
delivery platform (GrubHub). The delivery person dropped off her
meal on time. However, the meal contained an ingredient that
caused the client to have an allergic reaction; thus, making the
client very sick (The order had included a request for this ingredient
to be removed). Due to the bad experience, the client decided to
cancel her contract with our participants.
3) Upwork Scenario. Participants used a freelancing platform
(Upwork) to hire someone to translate an important report from
English to French for a French client. The translation was delivered
on time and the translation seemed to be of high quality. However,
due to a glitch in the system, the last part of the essay was truncated.
Because the customer did not know French they had not realized
that the report was truncated. They gave the truncated transla-
tion to their French client making a bad impression and losing the
contract with the client.
For each of these three gig markets, we trained our tool to detect
reviews that involved factors outside a workerâĂŹs control. For
this purpose, for each gig market we: (1) collected 1,000 real-world
reviews from SiteJabber (for the three scenarios); (2) had two inde-
pendent college graduate coders classify each of these reviews into
whether they involved workerâĂŹs performance or factors outside
the workerâĂŹs control. We provided summaries of what factors
were considered to be within the worker’s control and examples of
which ones were not. Coders were also given a link to the policies
of each of the three gig markets to better assess the variables that
the marketplace considers are under a workerâĂŹs control. Some
explained examples were given to coders to have a common agree-
ment when dealing with ambiguous cases. The two coders agreed
on the classification of 94.7% of all the reviews (CohenâĂŹs kappa
=.86: Strong agreement). We then asked a third college graduate
coder to act as a tiebreaker in cases of disagreement. After this step,
for all three types of gig markets, we had a labeled set of reviews.
The labeled data was provided as input to Reputation AgentâĂŹs
Smart Validator to train its models. Reputation Agent uses stratified
sampling to split the labeled data into training, test, and validation
User study fictional scenario
Control Reputation Agent
Feedback form at the end of the user study 
Control + Rating Reputation Agent + Rating
Our system detected that you likely wrote the review considering 
things that the driver could not control. Please re-write your review 
trying to remove these things.
Remember that the traffic, the GPS route, and the rates are not under 
the driver's  control.Please take this into account when reviewing 
your driver again. You can check out more about Uber’s policies for 
drivers here.
Our system detected that you likely wrote the review considering 
things that the driver could not control. Please re-write your review 
trying to remove these things.
Remember that the traffic, the GPS route, and the rates are not under 
the driver's  control.Please take this into account when reviewing 
your driver again. You can check out more about Uber’s policies for 
drivers here.
Please provide a written review about your driver. Please provide a written review about your driver.
Please provide a written review about your driver. Please provide a written review about your driver.
Figure 3: General Interfaces per condition.
sets under proportions of 80%, 10%, and 10% (the validation set helps
to avoid overfitting). We implemented early stopping as a method
to stop training once the model performance stops improving on a
hold out validation dataset. For our deep learning module, we used
a binary cross-entropy loss function, ADAM [60] as an optimizer,
and a learning rate of 0.001.
Across conditions, participants wrote their review based on their
fictional scenario and using one of the four possible interfaces:
1) Control (written text). The end-user is presented with a tra-
ditional textbox where they must write a review about the worker.
2) Control + Rating. The end-user is presented with a tradi-
tional textbox where they must write a review about the worker,
as well as complete traditional 5-star rating questions. These rat-
ing questions match the ratings that are currently present in the
particular gig market in which the participant is operating (e.g.,
participants in the Uber scenario were presented with the rating
questions that Uber uses to review drivers).
3) Reputation Agent. The end-user is presented with a tradi-
tional textbox where they must write a review about the gig worker
while receiving prompting from Reputation Agent.
4) Reputation Agent + Rating. The end-user is presented with
a traditional textbox where they must write a review about the gig
worker while receiving prompting from Reputation Agent. The
end-user is also asked to complete traditional 5-star rating ques-
tions about the worker. Here, the rating questions again match the
questions present in the given gig market.
Fig. 3 presents a general overview of how the interfaces per
each condition looked. Fig. 4 presents the different rating interfaces
we considered per gig market. We aimed for these rating inter-
faces to mimic the ratings that particular gig markets have as we
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GrubHub
UberRating interfaces
Upwork
Provide a written review about your freelancer Provide a written review about your delivery person
Please provide a written review about your driver.
Figure 4: Rating interfaces per Gig Market.
were interested in studying how our tool performed within main-
stream settings. Notice that in the Reputation Agent conditions, we
stored all the review attempts to analyze how peopleâĂŹs behavior
changed.
Our between-subjects study had 12 conditions that involved
three different fictional scenarios (three types of gig markets) where
four different interfaces for reviewing workers were used. Each
condition had 40 participants. PeopleâĂŹs participation consisted
of writing the review for the worker they were assigned and then
completing a follow-up survey to provide feedback about their
experiences. Specifically, the survey questioned people about: (1)
Who or what was responsible for the bad service they had received
on the gig platform? (gig worker, requester, platform algorithms,
client, or other) (2) How much fault did each of those actors have?
(3) How much did they think that their review would affect the
workerâĂŹs reputation? (4) As a customer of gig platforms, what
type of review interface (written or 5-star rating reviews) did they
prefer? (5) As a worker or requester of gig markets, what type of
reputation mechanism (written or 5-star rating reviews) did they
prefer? (6) How much did they feel that the interface helped them
to give more accurate feedback about workerâĂŹs performance?
(7) How did their review process (if any) change after completing
the review with their interface? Once participants had submitted
their review and completed the follow-up survey, we analyzed
whether the reviews they submitted were fair, specifically whether
they integrated factors outside a gig workerâĂŹs control or not
(to study the effectiveness of Reputation Agent). For this purpose,
we had two independent college graduate coders read each of the
final reviews that participants generated and categorize whether
the review blamed the worker on factors outside the workersâĂŹ
control or not (coders were also given the policies of each gig
market to help their categorization, examples and summaries of the
policies). The two coders agreed on the classification of 95.1% of
all the reviews produced by participants (CohenâĂŹs kappa =.87:
Strong agreement). In cases where there was disagreement, we
asked a third college graduate coder to act as a tiebreaker. In all
Fair reviews per interface
Gig Markets
Fa
ir 
re
vi
ew
s
Uber GrubHub Upwork
Figure 5: Percentage of fair reviews created per gig market
scenario and when using a particular interface.
cases, we categorized the first and last reviews submitted in order
to determine how much Reputation Agent lead people to change
their reviewing behavior.
We recruited a total of 480 participants using university mailing
lists, social media, and via postings on gig markets. Note that these
are the same methods utilized by prior work to recruit requesters
for studies [39]. Important to note is that all our participants had
been at least once a requester (employer or customer) on the gig
market to which they were assigned. 55% of our participants were
male, and 45% were female. Participants were between the ages
of 21 to 70 years old, with the median age being 35. All had at
least a High School degree, 59% had a bachelor’s degree, 17% a
master’s degree, and 2% a Ph.D. degree. Some of our participants
had been workers at least once on gig platforms: 18% on Uber, 18%
on Upwork, and 12% on GrubHub (which is normal given that gig
markets allow people to take on both roles.) Participants were paid
$2.00 USD to participate, and the study took at most 15 minutes.
5 RESULTS
Figure 5 presents across gig markets the number of fair reviews
that were generated when using a particular interface. Table 1
presents examples of reviews that were classified as unfair and fair.
Across gig markets, the people using Reputation Agent wrote a
larger number of fair reviews. In certain scenarios, having people
use Reputation Agent leads to an increment of fairer reviews in
comparison to when Reputation Agent was not used. For instance,
for the Uber scenario when people used the control interface, only
10% of the reviews were fair (i.e., 90% were unfair reviews where
people blamed their driver for factors outside her control, e.g., bad
traffic.) However, when using Reputation Agent the number of fair
reviews increased up to 70%.
We also note that in some scenarios, having Reputation Agent
operate with both textbox and numerical rankings lead people
to write a slightly higher number of fairer reviews than when
using only a textbox (this is the case for the GrubHub scenario).
However, we also note that for Upwork and Uber there were a
higher number of fair reviews when Reputation Agent operated
only with a textbox (and no numerical ranking). To test whether
these observed differences were significant or not, we conducted a
series of statistical tests. After determining that our data did not
meet the normality assumption, we decided to run an omnibus non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis test (p < .00001, H = 81.9303) and the
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Table 1: Examples of reviews that were written by study par-
ticipants and categorized as âĂĲunfairâĂİ and âĂĲfairâĂİ
across gig market scenarios.
Unfair Blame worker for things outside their control
Uber âĂĲI am beyond pissed. This driver took a ridiculous route causing a 45min delay and had the nerve to
overcharge me on it! I was late for work and obviously, my boss was not pleased. Thanks a lot, Uber.âĂİ
GrubHub âĂĲThe delivery person failed to perform one of the basic functions of their job, which was ensuring
the product they picked up was correct. He brought lunch to one of my clients and she couldnâĂŹt
even eat it due to allergy concerns. Our food had peanut butter when I clearly stated no peanut butter.
Very annoyed. I wasted my time and my money.âĂİ
Upwork âĂĲWorking with this person was a pain in the ass! I had a very important proposal to give to an
important potential client who only spoke French. As I only speak English I contracted with this worker
to translate it for me. They submitted too close to the deadline with little wiggle room, making it
impossible to fix or check for any issues. They sent accidentally incomplete work. It cost me a contract
due to his negligence. I do not recommend him, as heâĂŹs not meticulous.âĂİ
Fair Assessed factors that the worker could control.
Uber âĂĲThe GPS of my driver leads me to a very congested route today and it took me a lot more time and
money to get to work. But these things happen. I could have made the same choice driving myself so
the driver canâĂŹt be blamed for something out of their control. Driver and his car were very nice. I
am however very unhappy with the service and will be immediately unsubscribing soon.âĂİ
GrubHub âĂĲThe delivery person got the food to me on time. It was not their fault that the order was wrong.
The order was wrong because of the people at the restaurant. They messed up what was suppose to be
a great lunch. The driver did all he was supposed to do and I give him a good review for that..âĂİ
Upwork âĂĲI thought the worker did a good job and the work was presented well, it is a shame however that
the system failed at the last minute and I got an incomplete submission.âĂİ
MannâĂŞWhitney U-tests with Bonferroni correction (p < .00001,
z = 9.05126, U = 20400) to identify post hoc effects over conditions.
Through this analysis, we found that there was indeed a significant
difference in the number of fair reviews that people generated when
using Reputation Agent when compared to reviews generated with
traditional interfaces. In other words, we found that participants
are significantly less likely to write unfair reviews when using
Reputation Agent than with normal interfaces.
We also investigated how much Reputation Agent helped people
to start changing their reviewing behavior. For this purpose, we
measured the number of people who, while using Reputation Agent,
changed their original review from being unfair to fair (see Table
2). On average, across gig markets, Reputation Agent was able to
convert two out of every three of the reviews that were originally
unfair to fair (67.1%). For when people decided to not change their
unfair review, we analyzed the reasons for this behavior by observ-
ing what they stated in the survey. This analysis can help us to
identify some of the challenges that Reputation Agent has in ensur-
ing fairness in gig markets. We used open coding to extract initial
concepts from people’s responses [82]. We aimed for these initial
concepts to consider the themes that related work had derived on
people’s motivations for writing certain types of reviews [41, 68].
Next, we discussed these initial concepts as a group to iterate on
them and created a codebook (list of themes).
The codebook with examples was shared with two coders that
agree in the 91% of the reasons (CohenâĂŹs kappa =.81: Strong
agreement) and a third college graduate coder to act as a tiebreaker
in cases of disagreement. We detected the following categories
describing participants’ reasons for not changing their reviews:
5.0.1 Truthfulness. Some reviewers (21% of all reviewers who
chose not to change their review after prompts from Reputation
Agent) felt that changing their review implied lying about how
they felt and wanted to keep their review as it was because it was
truthful. Examples of their reasoning:
Table 2: Corrected reviews after ReputationAgent prompted
participants. 2 out of every 3 reviews were corrected.
Gig market Condition Corrected reviews
Uber Reputation Agent 66.6%
Reputation Agent + Rating 70.2%
GrubHub Reputation Agent 80.9%
Reputation Agent + Rating 73.3%
Upwork Reputation Agent 57.8%
Reputation Agent + Rating 53.4%
âĂĲI always give honest and detailed reviews and will continue
to do so. This interface will not impact on my reviewing process. I
will always stand by how I have done things in the past: with the
truth!âĂİ Uber Reviewer 44.
âĂĲWhy on earth would my process change? [...] if I get bad work,
I’m going to leave an honest review regardless of whether it was the
"platform" or the worker’s faultâĂęâĂİ, Grubhub Reviewer 15.
âĂĲ...I like being honest and factual with reviews. ThatâĂŹs why
I donâĂŹt like changing my reviewsâĂęâĂİ Upwork Review 43.
5.0.2 Agency. These reviewers (25%) felt that although a gig mar-
ketâĂŹs policies might dictate that certain actors were not to blame,
they believed that such actors should have had more agency in their
decisions despite the policies of the gig market.
âĂĲDrivers should be able to tell which routes are clean by instinct
based on the day and the time of the day without even looking at
the GPS. The drivers should know the city that they are driving very
well...âĂİ Uber Reviewer 23.
âĂĲWell the delivery guy didn’t listen to a word I said so now my
client canâĂŹt eat the meal. If he has any type of peanut in their food
they can go into anaphylactic shock and die. That is not what I want
for their lunch? Is that what you want them to have for lunch? Death?
The delivery guy really needs to be responsible for this.âĂİ Grubhub
Reviewer 32.
âĂĲ...LetâĂŹs be honest, the worker did not perform as well as
expected. She missed that some words were cut off. The bottom line is
that she needs to learn to handle herself responsibly in the world.âĂİ
Upwork Reviewer 19.
5.0.3 Empathy. These reviewers (36%) felt they needed more
time to analyze the scenario before changing their review. They
appeared to have empathy for all actors involved and wanted to
truly understand their situation before changing their review.
âĂĲI like to think about all the circumstances before writing re-
views. I like to use empathy. In my future review I will probably be a
bit less harsh on drivers. I will think about the driver and how they
treated me as well. But before I make those change I will try to calm
down firstâĂęâĂİ Uber Reviewer 21.
âĂĲ...I wanted to focus on the bad aspects of my meal, but then I
realized I was supposed to focus on the deliverer only. So I switched it
and focused on the delivery worker instead. I try to take all factors
I am aware of into account when writing my review, and wait a bit
so that any emotions associated with the work would not affect my
review. I think I would wait to re-write my review so I am not angry
and really think about the workerâĂęâĂİ Grubhub Reviewer 5.
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âĂĲI like to take software and platform issues into account before
completely blasting a worker in a review (either with stars or a written
review). I wonâĂŹt change my review now because I have to stop and
think about things. Instead of just getting mad and going off on the
worker immediately. I would also want to have more communication
between worker and purchaser before the review process, and have
a way to discuss the review if either party truly found it to be in
error.âĂİ Upwork Reviewer 39.
5.0.4 Warning. Some participants (13%) maintained their review
because it was important for them to have a space where they
could caution others about what they experienced. They did not
care about whether they blamed the incorrect person.
âĂĲ...I just detailed the problems I encountered with the driver. I
wanted others to know about my issue so that it doesnâĂŹt happen
to them as well.âĂİ Uber Reviewer 49.
âĂĲ...I usually never provide reviews for delivery people [...] But in
this case the service was exceptionally bad and my experience would
serve as a cautionary tale to others. So that is why I canâĂŹt change
it [the review]âĂİ GrubHub Reviewer 5.
âĂĲ...I think my review would let people know of the risks about
using this worker/platform. They could potentially avoid situations
like the one that I was in. ItâĂŹs important for me to keep my review
to warn others....âĂİ Upwork Reviewer 20.
67% of the people using Reputation Agent reported that they felt
that the interface helped them to be more aware of inaccuracies
in their reviews. Participants across conditions reported that they
felt their review would affect workerâĂŹs reputation. People in the
control condition had the perception that their review would be
the most harmful (mean 3.9 of 5). This is notable when compared to
people using Reputation Agent who on average thought that their
review would not be as harmful (mean 2.9 of 5).
6 DISCUSSION
Our experiments demonstrated the potential of using intelligent
web plugins to detect unfair reviews on gig markets, and then
prompt fairer assessments by presenting micro-information about
gig workers’ conditions and policies. Across different marketplaces,
the majority of people using Reputation Agent ended up writing
fairer reviews. Our study provides a novel insight into how market-
places could use this type of smart web plugin to bringmore fairness
to workers. In this section, we discuss opportunities and challenges
we see with Reputation Agent, and highlight design implications
for future systems that operate within the gig marketplace.
6.1 Building Empathy In Gig Markets
Taking empathy into account in the human-centered design process
can align designers with the values and needs of people who may
use the platforms [12]. Mencl et al. defines empathy as “a positive
moral emotion that aids reasoning[80].” Our study highlighted that
prompting people to reconsider their reviews and reason more
deeply about the worker and what her actual job was, helped re-
viewers to be fairer.
While all our participants considered that their reviews would
have an impact on workers’ lives, the level of harm that people
attributed to their review varied across conditions. People using
the control (text only) interface tended to believe their reviews
were the most harmful while people using the Reputation Agent +
Rating interface felt they were doing the least harm to workers. The
“tension between reason and emotion when making decisions[38]”
allows us to see the benefit of a tool such as Reputation Agent in
prompting requesters to reconsider their written review. Thus, our
results highlight that providing more metrics and guidance helped
people feel as if they were doing less harm to workers while still
submitting a review that was accurate.
We see tools like Reputation Agent as a way to help requesters
have a more humane perspective of workers by providing more
transparency and awareness of what the current labor conditions
are in gig markets. Through Reputation Agent we offer a way in
which requesters can be guided to better understand the actual job
expectations for workers. We believe that through this transparency
and highlighting of boundaries denoting gig workers’ labor that
we will be able to build more consideration for workers within gig
markets [55]. Several of our participants who Reputation Agent
prompted to change their reviews discussed how the tool helped
them to better understand workers’ conditions.
From our study, we also identified that there were cases where
people even after being prompted by Reputation Agent, refused to
change their review at all. Many of these individuals were people
who felt that workers needed to have more agency. For instance,
in the Uber case, some passengers believed that their Uber driver
should not have followed the recommended GPS route, but instead
selected a shortcut and better route. These individuals blamed their
Uber drivers for not taking the initiative and knowing enough of
their city to understand that the GPS algorithm was wrong. We
believe that in these cases, it might beworth designing interventions
where the policies and responsibilities of gig workers are explained
in detail to these individuals from the outset. We believe there is
an opportunity in using systems like Reputation Agent as a way to
create more empathy between requesters and workers. Additionally,
it might be worth explaining to workers the perspectives of these
requesters in order to facilitate their understanding of why certain
requesters might expect them to not always follow an algorithm and
be more “proactive.” In these cases, we visualize platforms that do
not penalize workers for not being proactive (i.e., by following the
instructions of the algorithm), but rather help workers open their
minds to other perspectives and help them to see that having more
agency in their decision process could provide growth opportunities,
e.g., to eventually become a manager.
6.2 Supporting Reflection In Gig Markets
Our study contained 46 individuals who refused to modify their
review even after being prompted. We considered it important
to understand the reasons these individuals had for not changing
their written assessments. In some cases, requesters used the review
process as a chance to communicate to the platform that it would be
more efficient (in terms of time and cost) if the worker was allowed
more agency. We believe there are benefits to gig markets when
they understand the type of agency that requesters want to see in
the market. Platforms could consider alternate methods/systems
for capturing this type of feedback in order to protect workers.
Williams et al. found that tools that are based on only distribut-
ing ratings and reviews for task choosing decisions usually tend to
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create fragmentation and discrimination affecting the platform’s
fairness [102]. We argue that it is important to tie tools like Repu-
tation Agent with platforms focused on driving citizen discussions
and citizen reflection [75]. On this point, it is important to consider
the findings of Li et al. concerning the influence that embodied
conversational agents (ECAs) have on persuading people to con-
sider feedback that is offered them [69]. “The use of agents that
resemble users” might be the necessary factor that allows requesters
to consider the promptings of the Reputation Agent to be more
valid. We must also ask: what type of agencies should we expect
from the different actors of the market and why is it important
that we expect such agency from them? Further research is needed
to investigate the type of interfaces and workflows that could be
used to incentivize and guide quality reflections about what people
expect from workers, requesters, and the different policies of a
marketplace. This type of system could uncover pain points that
exist in current crowd markets and where policy changes might be
needed. Our study also highlighted another reason why requesters
did not desire to change their review: the importance for them to
use the space to truthfully share their experiences. In the widely
cited paper âĂĲThe Market for Goods and the Market for IdeasâĂİ
[20], it is argued that in the market for goods (i.e., the market where
consumer goods and services are exchanged), government regula-
tion is desirable; whereas in the market for ideas (i.e., the market
where opinions or beliefs are interchanged), government regula-
tion should be limited. Online reviews can be seen as something
that delivers both âĂĲgoodsâĂİ and âĂĲideasâĂİ. On one hand,
having a person write an objective review of the work someone
did could be seen as if they are delivering a good. The good, in
this case, corresponds to the overall assessment of the labor that
the worker did. This assessment not only helps the market better
contextualize and measure the labor that is being produced [56],
it can also boost the SEO of the marketplace [94]. Thus, helping
it appear higher in the results of search engines and ultimately
bring in more customers [87]. The review can also help the worker
get better credentials, access higher pay, and more requesters (i.e.,
the review might persuade other requesters to hire the worker).
Reviews as goods deliver services to the marketplace, workers, and
even other requesters. However, reviews also have the capacity
to deliver opinions and beliefs, and hence can also belong within
the market of ideas. Thus, we see value in being able to actively
regulate the activities that belong to the market for goods, while
permitting freedom of expression for activities that relate to the
market for ideas [20]. Reputation Agent offers an advancement
towards this area by providing a way to regulate reviews within
the market for goods and flagging reviews that might pertain more
within the markets of ideas. Future work could pursue this avenue
to design review interfaces to express both forms of reviews.
6.3 Rating Systems and Fairness
The importance of rating systems and fairness is an essential el-
ement in gig markets, whether it pertains to rating workers or
rating requesters[28, 54, 95]. Creating a fair working environment
with structures designed to protect workers’ rights to receive fair
compensation for their labor ensures the reputation and success of
gig markets[1, 11, 35, 81, 95] Thus, devising a tool for gig markets
to implement in order to ensure fair reviews for workers brings us
one step closer to achieving this.
To this purpose, our findings that people tended to write fairer
reviews with Reputation Agent when working with the written
interface is an important addition to the tools available to gig mar-
kets. In our study, we also discovered that people tended to write a
larger number of unfair reviews when Reputation Agent was tied
with numerical ratings. This was specifically the case with Uber
and Upwork, where having numerical ratings tied with a written
review, led to a larger number of unfair reviews than when working
with just Reputation Agent and a written interface. Upon closer in-
spection, we identified that the problem was the fact that the rating
systems of these gigmarkets did not distinguish workerâĂŹs perfor-
mance from factors outside the workerâĂŹs control. For instance,
when assessing a driverâĂŹs rating on Uber, the market provides
a list of possible issues and presents âĂĲpoor routeâĂİ as an op-
tion even though Uber policies outline that drivers should always
follow the recommend GPS route (unless explicitly instructed oth-
erwise by the passenger). As a result, several participants selected
âĂĲpoor routeâĂİ as an issue and then wrote lengthy reviews blam-
ing the driver for the traffic (despite the prompts from Reputation
Agent). Similarly, we noted that markets which differentiated be-
tween metrics pertaining to workers vs the platform, led people to
generate fairer reviews. For instance, GrubHub has a rating system
that differentiates between these two types of metrics, and we saw
there was a decrease in the number of unfair reviews generated by
participants. We see then the necessity of gig markets to not only
incorporate tools that promote fairer reviews, but they themselves
must also clarify and communicate the metrics that pertain to the
workers.
Unfair reviews may also be the product of biases which do not
necessarily reflect a worker’s performance, i.e., when a worker
gets more positive ratings than expected given the service she
provided. These types of reviews can be influenced by cognitive
biases such as confirmation bias [62], driven by having prior beliefs;
anchoring effect [19], relying more on the first piece of information
offered and hence the current performance does not matter; or
perception bias [45], motivated by how others might perceive you
as the reviewer. Reputation Agent provides the opportunity to
educate people about possible biases they might have and how
those might be impacting their reviews. Here, we envisage that
Reputation AgentâĂŹs prompts might provide information about
biases in addition to information about the policies of gig markets.
Future research could focus on personalized feedback according to
personality or cultural biases that might exist [51, 65, 70, 76, 106].
6.4 Feasibility And Maintainability
Through our controlled experiments, we identified that Reputation
Agent was able to lead requesters to generate fairer reviews than
when they worked with the control interfaces. However, to accom-
plish these results, it was necessary to have labeled data for each
gig market on what constitutes fair reviews and what constitutes
unfair reviews. While the labeled data sample that we used was
relatively small in comparison to the large number of reviews that
are generated on these marketplaces daily [5], it is possible that
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new gig markets might have a difficult time collecting and labeling
review data for Reputation Agent.
We have released our system1 to help gig markets easily adopt
and use our tool. Additionally given that Reputation Agent can be
easily implemented as a validation module, Platform maintainers
could change their front-end review interface without having to
worry about Reputation Agent suddenly not working. Reputation
AgentâĂŹs deep learning nature makes it so that if a gig market
changes its policies, platform maintainers with minimum knowl-
edge in artificial intelligence can easily re-train Reputation Agent
to be updated with the changes [34, 99]. In our website we have
shared training examples for Reputation Agent’s learning module
so that website maintainers can easily start using our tool.
6.5 Key Design Considerations
Our investigation unraveled design considerations for technology
to support the generation of fairer interactions on gig markets.
6.5.1 Tools for Learning about Gig Market Policies. Reputa-
tion System can be seen as a tool that helps highlight the policies
of a gig market. For instance, when people are writing a review
for Uber, Reputation Agent shares UberâĂŹs policies. Future work
could explore how heuristics and hard-coded rules can lead people
to better understand the policies of a marketplace and comprehend
what falls under worker vs. platform responsibilities. The visual-
ization of different privacy policy representations can improve the
understanding of the different actors [71].
6.5.2 Tools for Better Moderation. Integrating artificial intelli-
gence (AI) into gig markets can go beyond flagging unfair reviews
[23]. AI can also be intermixed with human moderators to facili-
tate a better understanding of the perspectives of requesters. For
instance, given that Reputation Agent is able to store all the review
attempts that people make, the system could detect cases when
even after prompting the end-user to reconsider her review she still
kept everything the same. In which case, the system could trigger
an alert to human moderators to take a closer look at the review. We
view Reputation Agent as tool that can alleviate moderators’ labor.
The sustainability and self-management of the tool also depend on
the neutrality of the training data. Human-in-the-loop mechanisms
can allow different actors to have agency giving everyone decision
power, not just the few who can code [102] to define how the tool
is learning and taking the decisions.
7 LIMITATIONS AND FUTUREWORK
The insights from this work are limited by the methodology and
population we studied. Our controlled experiment allowed us to
begin understanding how users engage with Reputation Agent. Al-
though, we cannot extrapolate on how people would respond if this
approach were implemented in a field deployment with conditions
such as limited time and reduced willingness to reconsider their
reviews. Our attempt to counter this issue was by implementing
interfaces and creating scenarios that mimicked various gig mar-
kets and circumstances. However, future work could benefit from
analyzing how systems like Reputation Agent are used when people
are on the go and suffer from time constraints. While the scenarios
1https://research.hcilab.ml/reputationagent
we studied resembled very specific real-world situations, our results
might not yet generalize to populations at large or to different types
of situations. Further analysis is needed to understand how studies
that leverage real gig market actors and Reputation Agent play out
in helping users to give more objective reviews.
Reputation Agent was designed to limit the amount of extra in-
terface controls that platformmaintainers would have to implement.
The aim of this work is to provide a smart validation mechanism
for existing interfaces, i.e., easy to implement and not invasive. Fu-
ture work could also explore how adaptations in the workflow and
interface controls, such as a separated textbox for the reviews that
are generated with Reputation Agent, could lead to reducing unfair
reviews. This work explored the effect of using Reputation Agent in
two settings: with ratings tied to text reviews and with just written
text reviews (without any ratings). We studied whether in these set-
tings Reputation Agent could guide people to change their reviews
to fair ones. We choose to focus on written reviews in which having
one bad written review could not only lead to a worker having her
reputation jeopardized, but also having her account terminated. Fu-
ture work could explore how integrating fairness validators might
also influence the numerical ratings that people give to workers.
Our work replicates the current conditions of gig markets, where
people are never initially prompted or reminded to be fair in their
reviews, i.e., Reputation Agent prompts only when unfair reviews
are given. We established this setting because we considered that
customers would likely be busy individuals who simply wanted
their service delivered. Therefore, constant reminders of the gig
market’s policies could be considered invasive. If they have not
written an unfair review, it might not need highlighting. Future
work could explore how promoting fairness throughout different
points in time (e.g., directly when starting to write the review or
at the end) can lead to fairer reviews. Our study may also have
novelty effects that need to be studied through longitudinal studies.
Future work could explore how longitudinal studies can promote
fair reviews over time. This was a controlled experiment and not a
deployment, i.e., there was never money at stake and no real harm
done to the worker. Future work can compare how our results differ
from deployments in the real world.
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